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 ABSTRACT:  The paper challenges the view that public justifi cation sits well with eman-
cipatory and egalitarian intuitions. I engage political liberalism’s view of public justi-
fi cation. A standard objection to this view is that public justifi cation should be more 
inclusive in scope. This is both plausible and problematic in emancipatory and egal-
itarian terms. If inclusive public justifi cation allocates discursive standing that has 
much discursive purchase, as seems desirable in emancipatory terms, it is unable to 
allocate equal discursive standing within relevant scopes. And, if it must allocate equal 
discursive standing, discursive equality should be construed in terms that allow for 
unequal discursive purchase. 
 RÉSUMÉ :  L’article questionne les supposés rapports entre justifi cation publique et 
toute intuition émancipatrice et égalitaire. Je m’y confronte à l’idée de justifi cation 
publique selon le libéralisme politique. On lui objecte que la justifi cation publique 
devrait être plus inclusive. Ceci est tant plausible que problématique en termes éman-
cipateurs et égalitaires. Si une justifi cation publique inclusive alloue une posture ayant 
autant d’achat discursif que desire en terme d’émancipation, elle ne peut le faire au 
sein des domaines pertinents. Et, s’agit-il d’allouer une position discursive équivalente, 
l’égalité doit permettre un achat discursive inégal. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 Robustly public justifi cation—understood as a form of interpersonal justifi cation 
by a standard of reciprocal, equal acceptability—is often taken to resonate espe-
cially well with basic emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. Such justifi cation 
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aims to allocate to people a meaningful normative say in matters that affect 
them (emancipation), and it aims to accord an equal normative say to equal 
people (equality). This, it is sometimes said, is a key part of what it takes to 
properly respect people’s equal right to justifi cation, their equal autonomy, 
their equal dignity, or their freedom and equality.  1  Accordingly, robustly public 
justifi cation aims to not impose on anyone whom it respects accordingly views 
or decisions they can relevantly reject. Given its emancipatory and egalitarian 
commitments, then, it aims to be inclusive in scope and non-dogmatic in its 
starting points, methods of reasoning, or conclusions. 
 Many have doubted that there can be a form of public justifi cation that is 
emancipatory and egalitarian in the right way and that genuinely justifi es—
while applying to the real world, outside ideal theory.  2  While I side with the 
aspirations of non-ideal robustly public justifi cation, I will here add to these 
doubts. I will identify two problems that call into question whether robustly 
public justifi cation is well aligned with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. 
Prior to resolving these problems, I shall submit, there may not be a form of 
non-ideal robustly public justifi cation that suitably coheres with basic emanci-
patory and egalitarian intuitions. 
 The fi rst problem refl ects the interdependence between the scope of public 
justifi cation and what I call the ‘purchase’ of the discursive standing that such 
justifi cation allocates. If this standing entails a strong normative say, or is rich in 
purchase—as would be desirable in light of emancipatory intuitions—then 
public justifi cation may be unable to allocate such standing equally within a 
plausibly inclusive scope. But this runs up against egalitarian intuitions. The 
second problem refl ects the complex nature of discursive equality in justifi catory 
reciprocity. If public justifi cation must allocate to people equal discursive 
standing—as many proponents of this kind of justifi cation insist—the equality of 
that standing should be construed in terms that are purchase-sensitive (or so I 
shall suggest), but that nevertheless allow for purchase inequality. It is not clear 
what these terms are or how purchase inequality can sit with egalitarian intuitions. 
These are uneasy results for proponents of robustly public justifi cation.  3  
 My discussion proceeds as follows.  Section 2 develops conceptual tools that 
I will use in discussing the two problems just referred to, including an account 
of dimensions of what I call ‘discursive respect.’ I then turn to a paradigm form 
 1  See Forst ( 2015a ), (2015b), (2011), and (2007) esp. pp. 13-42, 209-211; Rawls ( 2001 ), 
(2005); Macedo ( 1991 ), chapter 2; Larmore ( 1990 ) and (2015). 
 2  Exemplary as a recent discussion of ideas of public justifi cation is Enoch ( 2015 ). 
I will comment on Enoch below, in fn. 34. 
 3  I suppose throughout that it would be good if robustly public justifi cation coheres 
with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions and accords to people an equal mean-
ingful say in relevant moral or political matters. This supposition is not uncontested: 
see Arneson ( 2004 ), esp. p. 46f; Steinhoff ( 2015 ). 
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of public justifi cation, i.e., the one advanced in Rawls-type political liberalism. 
 Section 3 identifi es the kind of discursive standing that this kind of public jus-
tifi cation accords to its fully enfranchised participants: it allocates a strong, 
constitutive form of discursive standing that is deep in the order of justifi ca-
tion, rich in discursive purchase, yet notoriously limited in scope. In light of 
emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions, a standard response here is to argue 
that liberal public justifi cation should be more inclusive in scope. But can there 
be a duly non-dogmatic, inclusive form of robustly public justifi cation that sits 
well with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions? This prompts my discussion 
of the two above problems. I attend to the fi rst problem in  Section 4 , and dis-
cuss the second problem in  Section 5 . 
 2.  Robustly Public Justifi cation and Discursive Standing 
 Let me start with a generic notion of robustly public justifi cation. I will fi rst 
consider publicness and then robustness. 
 Roughly, to say that  φ (e.g., a value judgement, principle, conception of 
justice, etc.) is justifi able ‘publicly’ is to say that  φ is authoritatively (e.g., reason-
ably, rationally, coherently) acceptable by relevant people (e.g., actual or pos-
sible people, affected others, fellow citizens). Alternatively, it is to say that  φ is 
justifi able by ‘public’ reasons, or reasons that are authoritatively acceptable by 
relevant people. This ‘acceptability’ standard can take many different forms. 
For example, there are positive and negative variants—we might require author-
itative acceptability, or authoritative non-rejectability. And, if ‘acceptability’ is 
interpreted in thin modal terms, so as to count  φ as ‘acceptable’ by people 
when it is  possible that they accept  φ , the standard might amount to little more 
than an O’Neill-type followability requirement.  4  Next, if the standard is applied 
only to  φ , and not also to Betty’s and Paul’s reasons to accept  φ , it is compat-
ible with convergence requirements that allow  φ to count as publicly justifi able 
even if Betty and Paul cannot agree at the level of their reasons to accept  φ . 
Alternatively, the standard might apply also at the level of Betty’s and Paul’s 
reasons to accept  φ , but not also to their views as to why their respective reasons 
are good: this would allow for convergence at a deeper level of thought and 
argument. Not least, the standard can be applied at different levels of thought, 
argument, or decision making—as the example just provided already illustrates—
and it can be applied with varying scopes, or constituencies. For example, the 
standard might seek acceptability by all or only some affected actual people, 
or perhaps only by non-existent, ideal agents. 
 Less uncontested amongst theorists of public justifi cation is robustness. I follow 
Gerald J. Postema’s account of the notion. Robustness concerns the features 
through which robustly public justifi cation confers on its conclusion whatever 
merit it confers on them. Robustly public justifi cation takes it that the interpersonal 
 4  O’Neill ( 1996 ), pp. 51-59. 
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authoritative acceptability of  φ , or reasons to accept  φ , confers, or is a key 
part of what confers, that merit—or that constitutes, or is a key part of what 
constitutes,  φ ’s authority, validity, rightness, or reasonableness.  5  This makes 
robustly public justifi cation intersubjective at heart and constructivist in a 
weak, justifi catory sense.  6  
 Of course, not all conceptions of public justifi cation are robustly public in 
this sense. For example, public justifi cation is sometimes understood as public 
in an extremely thin, promulgatory sense as justifi cation-in-public, or as a 
matter of laying out for others the reasons that, by the speaker’s light, justify  φ . 
Evidently, there is no implication here that these reasons, or their goodness, are 
subject to an interpersonal acceptability constraint. On a slightly more robust 
view, public justifi cation is justifi cation by reasons that are both good and sub-
ject to a (weak)  publicity constraint. On one recent view, for instance, to justify 
 φ publicly is to justify  φ by a subset of good (or ‘valid’) reasons, namely, those 
good reasons that at the same time are such that relevant people could, at a rele-
vant level of idealization, come around to grasping their goodness.  7  This, too, 
does not entail that the interpersonal acceptability of these (allegedly) good 
reasons is what constitutes, or even contributes to, their goodness. Robustly 
public justifi cation goes beyond these weak senses of the publicness of public 
justifi cation. Stephen Macedo, a fi rst-generation political liberal, aptly captures 
robust publicness:
 At the most basic level, public justifi cation has dual aims: it seeks refl ective justi-
fi cation (good reasons) but it also seeks reasons that can be widely seen to be good 
by persons such as they are. (…) [B]y pursuing [these aims] together we respect not 
only the goodness of good reasons, but also the freedom and equality of citizens 
whose capacity for reason is limited and who espouse widely divergent comprehensive 
views.  Indeed, the goodness of good reasons, for a public moral theory, becomes 
entirely a function of their capacity to gain widespread agreement among reasonable 
people moved by a desire for reasonable consensus.  8  
 5  See Postema ( 1995a ) and (1995b). 
 6  See Ronzoni ( 2010 ); Besch ( 2004 ), part I. 
 7  Steven Wall advances a form of public justifi cation that construes its publicness 
along such lines: see Wall ( 2016 ). Kevin Vallier, too, advances a publicity view of 
publicness. Roughly, for Vallier, Betty is justifi ed ‘publicly’ in believing  φ if she 
believes  φ on the basis of reasons that relevant other people can recognize as reasons 
that, from Betty’s perspective, justify her believing  φ . See Vallier ( 2015b ), esp. p. 
603f. See also Vallier ( 2011 ), and (2015a). Such views are not my primary concern 
here, although some of the problems I address below apply to them, too—but this 
goes beyond what I can argue here. 
 8  Macedo ( 1991 ), p. 46f. See also Rawls ( 2005 ), esp. lecture III. Emphasis is mine. 
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The last sentence makes the relevant point: robustly public justifi cation is robustly 
public in the sense that it takes the goodness of good reasons to  entirely be a 
function of their authoritative acceptability by relevant people. Arguably, fi rst-
generation political liberals like Macedo, Charles Larmore, and John Rawls, 
amongst others, take public justifi cation to be robustly public in this sense. 
 Next, given its robustly public character, robustly public justifi cation allo-
cates a strong form of discursive standing to its fully enfranchised participants. 
To bring out what this standing is, let me assume that, where we are reasonable 
and others are concerned, we pursue at least two aims. First, we aim to act 
toward them on grounds, widely conceived, that are acceptable by them—that is, 
at least in principle, ideally, or given the (perhaps counterfactual) assumption 
that they look at things in the right way—thus, we accord them discursive 
standing. Second, however, we also aim to act toward them on grounds that, 
at least as far as we can tell, are good. This entails that reasonable people can 
accord others at least  two kinds of discursive standing, depending on how they 
relate these two aims to one another.  9  
 First, we might accord others  derivative discursive standing. When we accord 
this standing, we aim to act toward others on grounds that are good and accept-
able, but we take the acceptability of these grounds, or valuable forms of it, 
to derive from a proper appreciation of their goodness. Thus, we seek “ideal” 
unanimity (Thomas Nagel) or “normative” consent (David Estlund).  10  Second, 
we might accord others a stronger,  constitutive form of discursive standing. 
Where we accord others this standing—or, as I shall also say, were we accord 
them discursive respect—we aim to act on grounds that are good and acceptable, 
but we take the goodness of these reasons to (at least partly) depend on, or be 
constituted by, their acceptability. As the last passage quoted above refl ects, 
Rawls-type public justifi cation allocates to its fully enfranchised participants 
standing of this second, stronger kind. 
 We can describe conceptions of robust public justifi cation as allocations 
of discursive respect: they prescribe that some form of constitutive discursive 
standing be allocated to each fully enfranchised participant, and lesser dis-
cursive standing, if any, to other people. As I argue in more detail elsewhere, 
allocation profi les of discursive respect can differ in various (interdependent, 
as we shall see later) dimensions, including what we might refer to as their 
‘scope,’ ‘depth,’ and ‘discursive purchase’ — we might call this the ‘matrix of 
discursive inclusion.’  11  The following provides a working notion of these 
three dimensions. 
  9  The discussion in this section follows the exposition of discursive respect and its 
dimensions in Besch ( 2014 ). 
 10  See Nagel ( 1991 ), p. 33f; Estlund ( 2008 ), p. 10. 
 11  For a specifi cation of these dimensions and an account of their interdependence: see 
Besch ( 2014 ), and below. 
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 To begin with scope, we ask questions about scope when we ask questions 
such as: ‘Who counts, or should count, as a fully enfranchised participant in 
public justifi cation, or as a full member of its constituency?’ or ‘Who or what 
merits discursive respect?’. Questions about the scope of discursive are ques-
tions about the range of actual or possible others to whom we accord, or should 
accord, constitutive discursive standing. Next, take depth. We ask questions 
about the depth of discursive respect when we ask, e.g., how fundamental in 
the order of justifi cation the things are that (allegedly) depend for their authority 
on their (qualifi ed) acceptability by (some) other, actual or possible people. For 
example, are these fi rst-order practical reasons only? Do they also include more 
fundamental, general moral or political principles? Is an acceptability require-
ment in some form applied even as a constitutive requirement of all practical 
reasoning, as some Kantian moral philosophers would have it?  12  
 Especially relevant here is discursive purchase—an often-neglected dimen-
sion of discursive respect that is rarely recognized as a relevant dimension of 
such respect in its own right. Often, it seems, purchase is construed as a mere 
function of the degree in which justifi cation standards idealize, while its im-
portance is seen as secondary to the importance of identifying suitable levels 
of idealization. It is true that idealization and purchase are tied together. As I 
argue elsewhere, high degrees of idealization entail low degrees of purchase, 
and high degrees of purchase require low degrees of idealization; it does not 
follow, though, that purchase is systematically secondary to idealization.  13  What 
we should take to be the systematic ordering between these things depends on 
the underlying aims of robust public justifi cation—where some candidate aims 
favour high degrees of idealization, and others high degrees of purchase. But 
let me set this matter aside now, and treat purchase as a legitimate and relevant 
dimension of discursive respect. What I shall say suffi ces for my present 
purposes; for a more thorough picture, it is best seen in conjunction with 
what I say elsewhere.  14  
 As I understand the notion, we consider the purchase of an agent’s discursive 
standing when we consider what degree of normative infl uence in relevant justi-
fi cation practices this standing accords to that agent, given her actual delibera-
tive resources, widely conceived (so as to include whatever views, volitions, 
skills, attitudes, capacities, and so on, she actually draws on in her practical 
reasoning). Purchase so construed is not a matter of the normative infl uence of 
non-actual, ideal agents in justifi cation practices, nor is it a matter of the infl u-
ence of actual agents with idealized resources. Instead, it is a matter of the 
normative infl uence of actual agents, given their actual deliberative resources, 
 12  For example, consider the status that Onora O’Neill accords to her “requirement of 
followability”: see O’Neill ( 1988 ), p. 716f, and (2000), chapter 1. 
 13  See Besch ( 2017a ). 
 14  See ibid.; Besch ( 2014 ). 
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in relevant justifi cation practices. In a sense, therefore, purchase helps to earth 
the normativity of justifi cation: it helps to describe what normative distance 
there is, if any, between how actual agents actually go about their practical 
reasoning, and how they would have to go about their reasoning in order to do 
so in ways that relevant justifi cation practices construe as authoritative. And, 
evidently, purchase is especially relevant in relation to emancipatory intuitions—
assuming that emancipation (rightly or wrongly, for better or worse) requires 
that real people such as they are be accorded a meaningful level of normative 
infl uence in matters that affect them. 
 Discursive respect can take many forms that greatly vary in purchase. 
To see how, recall that such respect involves an aim of acting on ‘acceptable’ 
grounds. When is  φ ‘acceptable’? Many modally different answers are possible. 
For example, consider:
  
 (1)  Paul accepts/does not reject  φ . 
 (2)  Paul is not committed to reject  φ in light of his actual views and volitions. 
 (3)  Paul would not reject  φ in light of views and volitions he would/could 
have if he was ideally reasonable/rational (as we defi ne this). 
  
Evidently, the purchase that discursive respect can have for its recipients will 
vary greatly depending on what we take acceptability to require. Take two extreme 
examples. First, consider, say,  actualist discursive respect—a conception of 
discursive respect that takes it that proper ‘acceptability’ requires something 
like (1) or (2). On such a conception, Betty’s constitutive discursive standing 
can have a high degree of purchase. If Betty cannot now accept  φ coherently, 
given her actual views and volitions, this would count as showing that  φ is not 
suitably acceptable by her. This seems to give her a veto: her ‘no,’ it seems, 
counts for a ‘no.’ Contrast this with  counterfactualizing discursive respect—or 
a conception of discursive respect that takes it that proper ‘acceptability’ requires 
something more like (3). On such a view, Betty’s discursive standing can have 
very little purchase. That she cannot now accept  φ coherently, or is committed 
to oppose  φ , might not count against  φ at all. For her rejection of  φ could be 
countered by the consideration that she would not reject  φ if she appreciated 
matters in a different, and, as  others see it, more reasonable or rational light. 
Thus, Betty’s actual views and volitions here might become irrelevant: her ‘no’ 
might not count for a ‘no.’ 
 Actualist discursive respect gives greatest normative weight to the actual 
views and volitions of people, or their actual deliberative resources. Once we 
start to normatively qualify, constrain, or launder these views and volitions, 
their impact  decreases and a gap opens between the actual acceptability and 
the normative acceptability of our grounds. This gap widens as these qualifi ca-
tions become normatively more remote, or harder to meet, relative to people’s 
actual views and volitions, or their actual deliberative resources. And, as it widens, 
the normative infl uence of their actual views and volitions decreases—and with 
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this decreases the purchase of their discursive standing. Take again a coun-
terfactualizing view. My discursive respect for you can have fairly little sig-
nifi cance for you if you know that it allows me to take my reasons to be suitably 
‘acceptable’ by you even if the actual you, in light of your actual views and 
volitions, could never actually accept them. 
 Two more remarks are in place. First, I index discursive purchase to an 
agent’s  actual deliberative resources. An alternative is to index it to the ideal 
resources of ideal agents, or the idealized resources of actual agents. As will 
emerge in  Section 5 , below, one reason to set aside these possibilities here is 
this: a focus on actual deliberative resources helps to keep in view potentially 
relevant forms of discursive inequality. Second, purchase and scope are linked: 
constraints on the scope of public justifi cation can often be translated into 
purchase-determining qualifi cations of the sort of acceptability that public 
justifi cation seeks (and  vice versa ).  15  For example, if acceptability by reasonable 
people justifi es, what justifi es is reasonable acceptability. Still, we should not 
subsume purchase under scope (or  vice versa ). Purchase is useful in assess-
ing in what way, if any, non-ideal public justifi cation accords to people equal 
discursive standing (or so I claim). At any rate, it is relevant here as my focus 
is on views of public justifi cation that, in one way or other, aim at a “basic 
structure of justifi cation”  16  that make questions of equality and emancipation, 
and with this of equal discursive purchase, relevant. 
 3.  Political Liberalism 
 I now turn to Rawls’s political liberalism, or one reading of the idea of public 
justifi cation at its core. On this reading, which I call the ‘deep view,’ public 
justifi cation has a special position in the matrix of discursive inclusion. On the 
deep view, public justifi cation not only fully enfranchises  actual reasonable 
people, given their  actual reasonable deliberative resources; it also accords 
them discursive respect that is deep in political liberalism’s order of justifi ca-
tion, rich in discursive purchase, yet problematically limited in its scope of 
inclusion. I will not here try to defend or even fully lay out the deep view, as 
this would go beyond what can be done now—I do so elsewhere.  17  Thus, I will 
employ it  heuristically : it serves as one candidate view of the role of public 
justifi cation in political liberalism that situates one of the longest-standing, 
recurrent concerns about the nature of that project. This is the concern that 
some of political liberalism’s core commitments stand in need of a (public) 
 15  There are other ways in which scope and purchase are related. See Besch ( 2014 ), 
and below. 
 16  See Forst ( 2012 ), p. 262. 
 17  I develop the deep view as an account of Rawls’s post-1985 views in Besch ( 1998 ) 
and (2004)—the latter also extends the deep view to Macedo’s and Larmore’s variants 
of political liberalism. See also Besch ( 2012 ), (2013), and (2017b). 
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justifi cation that political liberalism seems unable to itself provide  18  —and this 
in a way that renders political liberalism vulnerable to a charge of public 
dogma (see below). What matters here is this problem (I shall later address 
challenges faced by attempts to respond to it). Readers who prefer a different 
reading of Rawls hence can set aside the specifi cs of the deep view, so long as 
they grant that political liberalism, on  some relevant reading, faces a problem 
of that overall type.  19  
 I start with the idea of a political liberalism. If a conception of justice,  φ , 
is a political liberalism,  φ is liberal in content and political both in its form of 
justifi cation and domain of application. If  φ is liberal in content,  φ allocates 
to citizens basic rights and liberties of special priority, as well as all-purpose 
means that help citizens to make use of these rights and liberties. If  φ is polit-
ical in form of justifi cation, it does two things. It (i) adopts the  constructivist 
standard that reciprocal, equal acceptability by reasonable people justifi es. 
And, importantly, (ii) it attaches a  populist  20  interpretation to that standard: 
that is, it interprets the standard such that  φ fails to meet the standard, or fails 
to qualify as reciprocally acceptable by reasonable people, already if  φ is the 
 actual subject of reasonable disagreement between these people (where reason-
able disagreement is defi ned as disagreement that can arise between reasonable 
people).  21  (i) and (ii) are at the core of Rawls’s political constructivism. And, 
for some political liberals, they are at the heart of an idea of political justifi ca-
tion that fully respects reasonable people as free and equal.  22  Not least, if  φ is 
political in its domain of application,  φ does two things.  φ regulates only the 
basic structure of a given society, or its most important social, political, and 
 18  For an early version of this concern: see Hampton ( 1989 ) and (1992); Campos ( 1994 ). 
 19  It is worth adding that we may consider political liberalism in this context even 
though its view of public justifi cation does not  expressly aim to serve the value of 
 emancipation . All we need is that this view sits well with emancipatory commitments. 
And this it does (on the deep view). I take emancipation to require that real people 
be accorded a meaningful level of normative infl uence in matters that affect them. 
Public justifi cation sits well with this commitment already if it accords to at least 
some people constitutive discursive standing of high discursive purchase. And, on 
the deep view, political liberals are (quite profoundly) committed to the view that 
some people should have this standing—namely, reasonable people. See below and 
the texts referenced in fn. 17, above. 
 20  Gaus ( 1996 ), p. 130f. 
 21  Rawls provides his criterion of the reasonableness of disagreement when he writes: 
“Let’s say that reasonable disagreement is disagreement between reasonable persons.” 
(Rawls  2005 , p. 55) 
 22  On the idea of respect that gives rise to political liberalism’s idea of public justifi cation: 
see the seminal Larmore ( 1990 ); Larmore ( 2015 ), esp. pp. 76-80; Macedo ( 1991 ), 
chapter 2. 
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economic institutions, or its domain of the political. And  φ regulates this 
domain exclusively in terms of ‘political values.’ Values are political only if 
they exclusively apply to this domain. But such values must also be part of the 
political tradition of the society under consideration. And, as Rawls focuses 
on the United States and its democratic political tradition, he takes it that 
political values favour liberal democracy. 
 As to the deep view of public justifi cation, then, it contrasts with a more famil-
iar ideal theory view. On the ideal theory view, public justifi cation is part of ideal 
theory  only , or supposes the context and normative resources of an ideal, well-
ordered society of the sort prescribed by Rawls’s theory of justice,  Justice as 
Fairness (JF). Ideal theory public justifi cation thus includes within its scope only 
the ideal reasonable citizens of an ideal, well-ordered society.  23  Now, the deep 
view of public justifi cation does not deny that Rawls makes use of an idea of 
ideal theory public justifi cation. But the deep view takes it that Rawls invokes an 
idea of public justifi cation also for other purposes, outside ideal theory. 
 Consider Rawls’s argument from overlapping consensus.  24  He argues that polit-
ical legitimacy is possible only if political power accords with a conception of 
justice that can gain an overlapping consensus between the reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines of reasonable people. This applies also here and now, outside ideal 
theory. Now, a reasonable overlapping consensus matters for the purposes of legit-
imacy because a conception of justice, if it is  in compatible with any one of the 
reasonable doctrines that reasonable people endorse, would  not be reciprocally 
acceptable by these people. To ensure a reasonable overlapping consensus just is a 
way to ensure reciprocal acceptability by the reasonable. Thus, political legitimacy 
here and now requires reciprocal acceptability by the reasonable here and now. 
Next, Rawls (notoriously) takes it that a conception of justice can gain an overlap-
ping consensus, or can meet the standard of reciprocal acceptability by the reason-
able, only if it avoids reasonable disagreement between reasonable people. Rawls 
interprets this in  populist terms:  actual reasonable disagreement about  φ can count 
as evidence that  φ is the subject of reasonable disagreement, and as such is not 
reciprocally acceptable. Rawls also insists that only a political and liberal concep-
tion of justice, if any, avoids reasonable disagreement. And it is for this reasons that 
he  here and now (re)formulates JF as a political liberalism. Taken together, these 
things suggest that reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people plays a funda-
mental role. It effectively serves as a standard of theory selection for the domain of 
the political, as it states a condition any conception of justice (allegedly) must meet 
in order to be suitable as a basis for a legitimate exercise of political power—and 
this applies also  here and now , outside ideal theory. 
 23  For a recent form of the ideal theory view, consider Jonathan Quong’s version of an 
internal conception of political liberalism: see Quong ( 2011 ). 
 24  The interpretation of the argument from overlapping consensus used here and 
below follows Besch ( 1998 ), chapter III, and Besch (2004), part I. 
Public Justifi cation, Inclusion, and Discursive Equality  11 
 To now bring in discursive respect: as anticipated above, Rawls-type public 
justifi cation allocates discursive respect that is (i)  deep in the order of justifi ca-
tion, (ii)  rich in discursive purchase, but (iii) notoriously  limited in scope. The 
discursive respect it allocates is deep since the standard of reciprocal accept-
ability by reasonable people effectively serves as a standard of theory-acceptance 
for the domain of the political. It is rich in discursive purchase as Rawls inter-
prets this standard in populist terms: at least in some cases, the fact that reason-
able people actually reasonably disagree about  φ , given their actual reasonable 
deliberative resources, counts as evidence that  φ is not reciprocally, equally accept-
able by all reasonable people. As to scope, public justifi cation is highly limited in 
scope. Only reasonable people are included in its scope on equal, fully enfran-
chised footing, and hence enjoy full constitutive discursive standing.  How 
limited in scope public justifi cation thereby is depends on  how much contested 
normative content goes into the idea of the reasonable on which public justifi ca-
tion builds. As a rule of thumb, the more such content goes into this idea, the 
more exclusionary public justifi cation will be. Like others, I take it that this idea 
is rich in contested normative content. Let me indicate why, on the deep view, 
this often-voiced complaint is justifi ed. 
 Recall that, for Rawls, political liberalism can avoid reasonable disagreement. 
Yet the label ‘political liberalism’ does not refer to just any suitably acceptable 
conception of justice, but to a conception that (i) is liberal in content, and (ii) 
constructivist and populist in form of justifi cation, and that (iii) exclusively 
applies to the domain of the political, and that does so by (iv) containing polit-
ical values only. As legions of critics have observed, however, there is disagree-
ment about the merits of these requirements. Now, if Rawls construes these 
disagreements as reasonable, he needs to concede that political liberalism is 
not reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable people. Yet Rawls does not draw 
this conclusion. He takes it that only a political liberalism, if anything, is  not 
the subject of reasonable disagreement. Arguably, then, he cannot construe 
disagreement about (i)-(iv) as reasonable. And this is tantamount to building a 
commitment to these requirements into the very idea of reasonableness on 
which public justifi cation builds.  25  By implication, Rawls needs to suppose, 
 25  On this reading, what political liberalism defi nes into its idea of the reasonable—or, 
as it employs various, systematically and substantively distinct ideas, the idea it treats 
as  politically basic (see Besch  2012 and Besch  1998 , chapter IV)—is not a commit-
ment to  token political value,  token public reasons, or a  token political conception of 
justice. People who are reasonable in political liberalism’s sense can coherently dis-
agree about such tokens (provided other conditions are met). What political liberalism 
defi nes into reasonableness is a commitment to (i)-(iv) (plus insularity, see below). 
Thus, reasonableness entails a commitment to a  type of values, a  type of reasons, and 
a  type of conceptions of justice. Of course, this marks a critical reading of political 
liberalism’s idea of reasonableness. Political liberals disagree with each other as to 
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as well, that reasonable people accept that reciprocal acceptability  by people 
like them justifi es, and that public justifi cation needs to include within its scope 
 only people like them . This makes political liberalism “insular.”  26  
 The upshot: deep public justifi cation here is justifi cation between people 
who endorse the defi ning requirements of political liberalism. A commitment 
to these requirements is part of the doxastic bedrock that public justifi cation 
supposes, and that everyone included within its scope is expected to share. 
But, again, in the actual world, outside JF’s ideal, well-ordered society of people 
who are reasonable in political liberalism’s sense, there are many relevant people 
who relevantly contest these requirements and who hence do not pass political 
liberalism’s threshold tests of reasonableness.  27  This is why the complaint that 
public justifi cation here is exclusionary is justifi ed. In fact, in light of the above 
considerations, political liberalism looks like a stretch of public dogma.  28  
 4.  Scope-Purchase Interdependence 
 What to make of this? Suppose we do not reject that a conception of justice, in 
order to be able to here and now provide a basis for political legitimacy, must 
here and now be justifi able in robustly public terms. A standard line of response, 
then, is to opt for a more inclusive form of robustly public justifi cation—one that 
builds the standard of reciprocal, equal acceptability on thinner threshold tests of 
reasonableness, if any, and that hence extends discursive standing of the strong, 
constitutive kind to more people in moral or political matters that affect them. 
how thick in content their respective notions of reasonableness are; Larmore insists 
that Rawls’s notion is much thicker than his own; Macedo insists that Larmore’s 
notion is thicker than Larmore allows; Macedo alone readily concedes that ‘reason-
ableness’ is not thin in content. On my reading, their notions are thicker than even 
Macedo concedes. See Larmore ( 2015 ), p. 74; Macedo ( 1991 ), p. 260f. 
 26  Estlund ( 2008 ), p. 55f. 
 27  Again, exemplary here: Enoch ( 2015 ), p. 121f. 
 28  Political liberals try to alleviate this problem. For example, Rawls suggests the 
reasonable address the unreasonable by arguing “from conjecture” (Rawls  2005 , 
p. 465f); Macedo proposes a second stage of public justifi cation that “re-engages” 
them (Macedo  1991 , p. 61ff.), and Larmore suggests (amongst other things) that the 
reasonable should consider not what the unreasonable actually can or cannot accept, 
but what they would accept or reject if they were reasonable (Larmore  1996 , p. 142). 
Alas, none of this overcomes the problem: in each case, without due justifi cation, 
the ‘unreasonable’ are allocated lesser, second-class discursive standing. See Besch 
( 2012 ) and (2013). Larmore also offers a contextualist view of (personally) justifi ed 
belief that would entail that public dogma does not occur as no justifi cation is owed 
to the unreasonable in the fi rst place. See Larmore ( 1996 ), parts I, III; Larmore 
( 2008 ), pp. 4f, 12; Larmore ( 2015 ), p. 71f. Yet this, too, does not overcome the 
problem: see Besch ( 2004 ), part I; Besch ( 2012 ). 
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 At fi rst pass, this seems compelling especially in light of emancipatory and egal-
itarian intuitions. As Rawls notes, we regard ourselves as “self-authenticating 
sources of valid claims”  29  —but not only in relation to the claims we make on 
institutions in pursuit of conceptions of the good.  30  We desire to be recognized 
by others as having an entitlement to make claims on them in relation to what 
they see as good reasons, at least in matters that affect us. One important part 
of this recognition is that they regard our non-acceptance of what they see as 
good reasons as something that can call into question, or put in need of justifi -
cation, the goodness of these reasons. It may or may not be the case that this 
desire can be met only if we are being accorded constitutive discursive standing 
of much purchase. But fully enfranchised inclusion in practices of robustly 
public justifi cation evidently speaks to this desire. And, if a justifi cation practice 
allocates this strong standing to anyone, it should allocate it equally to equal 
people. To say the least, not endorsing political liberalism’s defi ning require-
ments does not seem to make people  relevantly unequal . If anyone is to have 
discursive standing that is rich in purchase, then not only people who are rea-
sonable in political liberalism’s sense should have it. 
 In what follows, I assume that this line of response is plausible—other things 
being equal and assuming that a conception of political justice should be robustly 
publicly justifi able in the actual world, and not only in ideal theory. What I 
want to do now is to turn to the two problems referred to in the introduction. 
The fi rst problem refl ects the fact that the scope of robustly public justifi cation 
and the purchase of the discursive standing that such justifi cation can allocate 
are interdependent. The second problem refl ects the complex nature of discur-
sive equality in practices of justifi catory reciprocity. Both problems call into 
question whether a more inclusive form of robustly public justifi cation really 
can sit well with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. I shall now attend to 
the fi rst problem. 
 Let me suppose that fully enfranchised discursive inclusion is an important 
good. Still, we will need to balance this good against other, perhaps no less 
important goods when it comes into competition with them. And this it does: if 
discursive respect is rich in purchase, robustly public justifi cation is a mixed 
blessing. The more inclusive in scope public justifi cation is, the more doctrinal 
diversity is included in its scope—at least in the real world, outside ideal 
theory. But the richer in purchase the discursive standing is that each fully 
enfranchised person enjoys within practices of robustly public justifi cation, 
the stronger is the normative impact of this diversity on what these practices 
 29  See Rawls ( 2001 ), p. 23. 
 30  This is aligned with the views of the earlier Rawls, who sees the self-conception as 
a self-authenticating source of valid claims as part of people’s self-conception as 
moral (rather than only political) agents: see Rawls ( 1980 ), p. 543f. 
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may count as suitably acceptable, or justifi able. Thus, there is  scope-purchase 
interdependence :
 SP   Given inclusive scope: the more purchase discursive standing has, the less 
normative content, such as political principles or value judgements, can qualify 
as equally acceptable by all relevant others.  31  
For example, suppose liberal political principles must be equally acceptable by 
relevant citizens, while we read the phrase ‘equal acceptability’ in high-purchase, 
actualist terms: say, we count  φ as ‘equally acceptable’ by others only if  φ can 
coherently be accepted by them in light of their actual views and volitions. 
Plainly, then, liberal principles—or, by extension of argument, any other, mor-
ally interesting normative principles—cannot pass such an actualist threshold 
if the group of relevant citizens includes people whose moral, political, ethical, 
or other outlooks are inconsistent with them (and there almost always are such 
people). The point generalizes: the interdependence of scope and purchase can 
have problematic implications at any level of argument at which a standard of 
reciprocal acceptability applies as a standard of justifi cation. It hence can have 
these implications also in relation to the justifi cation status of the commitment to 
robustly public justifi cation, or of the view that discursive respect is important—
namely, if these things must be justifi ed by the standard of reciprocal acceptability. 
 As has often been noted, then, inclusive robustly public justifi cation is at 
risk of being both self-defeating and unable to secure substantively plausible 
results  32  —that is, so long as it accords discursive standing that is rich in 
purchase. This leaves robustly public justifi cation (RPJ) with several options:
  
  (i)  RPJ exempts from the requirement of reciprocal acceptability all normative 
content that no relevant person should reject (whatever content this is, but 
assuming it includes values that commit to RPJ and discursive respect). 
 (ii)  RPJ accords high-purchase discursive standing exclusively to people who 
do not reject normative content that no relevant person should reject. 
  
If robustly public justifi cation accords to people the kind of standing that (ii) 
refers to, it accords them a standing such that, if they cannot coherently accept  φ 
in light of their actual views and volitions (given basic criticality and reason-
ability), this counts as evidence that  φ is not suitably acceptable by them. A third 
option, then, is to reject an actualist notion of discursive standing altogether and 
to premise robustly public justifi cation on counterfactualizing discursive standing 
(David Enoch loosely refers to this as a variety of ‘idealization’):  33  
  
 31  The idea of a scope-purchase interdependence is developed further in Besch ( 2014 ). 
 32  Exemplary here: Enoch ( 2015 ), esp. p. 117f. 
 33  Ibid. See also next footnote. 
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 (iii)  In examining  φ ’s public justifi ability, RPJ examines whether relevant 
people can (could, would) suitably accept  φ  provided they do not reject 
normative content that no relevant person should reject. 
  
For example, suppose we want to protect  φ from likely opposition, and so decree 
that  φ is reciprocally acceptable by people if  φ is such that relevant people 
would not reject  φ if they were reasonable—where reasonableness is then 
defi ned in terms that are suitably geared toward the non-rejection of  φ . Thus, if 
Betty-when-‘reasonable’ would not reject  φ , then actual Betty’s actual inability 
to coherently accept  φ would not count as evidence against  φ ’s reciprocal accept-
ability (rather, it would count as evidence of Betty’s unreasonableness). 
 It is not clear what these three options would amount to in practice. But 
none seems desirable from an emancipatory and egalitarian point of view. 
Prior to further argument, the second option abandons the idea of  equal discur-
sive respect within inclusive scopes. And prior to further argument, the third 
option hollows out discursive respect and with it the emancipatory value of 
robustness in public justifi cation: what worth and use, if any, can Betty’s con-
stitutive discursive standing have for her if  φ counts as ‘equally acceptable’ 
by her even if she cannot accept  φ coherently in light of her actual views and 
volitions (given basic criticality and reasonability)? Not least, all three options 
call for an odd kind of government-house public justifi cation: a practice of 
public justifi cation the terms of which are from the outset tailored to insulate 
and protect pre-selected moral, political, or other content from likely opposition. 
And so long as we lack reassurance that this content really is such that no rele-
vant person should reject it—rather than content that, say, refl ects the parochial 
convictions of some dominant group or other—this seems to return us to a 
variant of public dogma. 
 The fi rst problem, then, is this. In light of emancipatory and egalitarian intu-
itions, robustly public justifi cation should allocate to people equal discursive 
respect that is inclusive in scope and meaningfully rich in purchase. But 
robustly public justifi cation seems unable to do so while ensuring plausible 
conclusions and avoiding self-defeat. At any rate, it seems that if such justifi -
cation must both be inclusive in scope and allocate high-purchase discur-
sive standing, it has to custom-tailor its agenda or abandon its commitment 
to equal discursive standing.  34  
 34  A note on Enoch ( 2015 ) is in place. He argues that public reason liberalism—his 
main target is Rawls-type political liberalism—responds to the presence of unrea-
sonable people by adopting idealization strategies that fail “the test for when ideal-
ization is an acceptable philosophical move” (ibid., p. 118) as they are not suitably 
supported by political liberalism’s underlying aims, and specifi cally the aim to respect 
the freedom and equality of citizens. Enoch’s focus is on two such strategies: the 
“exclusion” of the unreasonable from public justifi cation, and “going hypothetical,” 
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 5.  Reciprocity and Discursive Purchase 
 To now turn to the second problem, let me slightly shift the focus. Justifi cation 
by a standard of reciprocal acceptability—or justifi catory reciprocity, or “reci-
procity of reasons”  35  —seems egalitarian at heart. In requiring reciprocal,  equal 
acceptability of the views it applies to, the standard seems to call for justifi ca-
tion practices that accord  equal discursive standing to their fully enfranchised 
participants—even if this standing is being accorded only within limited scopes 
and with respect to limited agendas. Yet it is not clear in what way this standing 
really is ‘equal.’ I will now elaborate on aspects of the issue that have to do 
with the purchase of discursive standing. 
 To begin with, two assumptions should be put into place. The fi rst is this: 
in a justifi catory capacity, a standard of reciprocal, equal acceptability cannot 
require just any kind of equal acceptability. It must require equal  authoritative 
acceptability. For example, equally incoherent, ill-informed, or unreasonable 
acceptance cannot positively contribute to the justifi cation status of a view 
(or its validity, correctness, or reasonableness), nor can similarly defi cient 
rejections negatively contribute to it. The need for authoritativeness constraints 
complicates matters. For it entails that the question of whether some view,  φ , 
is equally acceptable by relevant people must be crossed with considerations 
which roughly is a species of option (iii), above (ibid., 120-130). Yet, insofar as he 
targets Rawls-type political liberalism, Enoch’s criticism misfi res. True, political 
liberalism does not include the unreasonable on fully enfranchised footing within 
the scope of public justifi cation. And, yes, it goes hypothetical at least in relation to 
the  unreasonable . For example, Larmore stresses that political liberalism considers 
the interests or views of the unreasonable by imagining what they would accept or 
reject if they were reasonable (Larmore  1996 , p. 142). But this  is supported by 
political liberalism’s aims. For,  from the outset , political liberalism aims to respect 
as free and equal not all citizens, but only  reasonable people. And,  from the outset , 
it fully includes in public justifi cation only people it respects as free and equal, i.e., 
 reasonable people. As Macedo puts it, political liberals “respect as free and equal 
moral beings all those who pass certain threshold tests of reasonableness: we respect 
those whose disagreement with us does not impugn their reasonableness” (Macedo 
 1991 , p. 47). Thus, political liberals do not aim to equally include the unreasonable 
 to begin with . Note that this does not commit them to an ideal theory view of public 
justifi cation. Instead, they can adopt the deep view of public justifi cation (see above). 
Enoch’s objection hence builds on an inadequate reading of public reason liberalism. 
The problem is not that political liberalism deploys idealizations that are not sup-
ported by its underlying aims. Rather, the problem is that it is vulnerable to a charge 
of public dogma—while attempts to fi x this problem while keeping a commitment to 
robustly public justifi cation in place seem to run into the diffi culties discussed above. 
 35  See Forst ( 2010 ), p. 719. 
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as to whether meeting the underlying authoritativeness constraint is suitably 
available to them. (Given my present context, I shall often put things in terms 
of a reasonableness threshold.) 
 A second, initially plausible assumption is this: the ‘equal’ discursive standing 
that practices of justifi catory reciprocity allocate should be equal not just in 
some abstract sense, but concretely in terms of its  discursive purchase . Consider 
a justifi cation practice, JP1, that allocates to Betty and Paul constitutive discur-
sive standing, and hence discursive standing of the same abstract kind, but 
applies to them different thresholds of authoritativeness such that their discur-
sive standing has unequal purchase. Say, Paul enjoys actualist discursive respect 
such that, if Paul cannot accept  φ in light of his actual views and volitions, the 
practice recognizes this as counting against  φ , or as showing that  φ fails to be 
suitably acceptable by Paul. Yet Betty is being accorded counterfactualiz-
ing discursive respect such that, if she cannot accept  φ in light of her actual 
views and volitions, this is not recognized as counting against  φ , but as count-
ing against her—say, it is counted as evidence that she is insuffi ciently reason-
able, rational, right-minded, and so forth. Surely, this would instantiate relevant 
discursive inequality: Paul has a veto, but Betty does not. Their discursive 
standing is equal in abstract kind, and so is  up to a point equal, but it is rele-
vantly unequal in purchase. (We shall see below that this assumption, despite 
its appeal, is problematic.) 
 These two assumptions suggest that the standard of justifi catory reciprocity 
calls for justifi cation practices that do two things (amongst many others): they 
apply authoritativeness constraints—or, given my focus: some reasonableness 
threshold—to the members of their constituency, or their deliberative behaviour, 
while simultaneously according them discursive standing of equal discursive 
purchase. However, real-life justifi cation practices may not be able to do both, 
or be known to do both. 
 Consider another justifi cation practice, JP2, that adopts a counterfactualizing 
conception of discursive respect and applies it consistently to all participants: 
say, one that defi nes deliberations, objections, acceptances, rejections, and so 
on, as authoritative, or as counting toward the justifi cation status of views, only 
to the extent that they are reasonable—while it construes reasonableness in 
normatively demanding terms. And suppose that these terms are demanding 
enough to make it relevantly harder for some participants than others to count 
as ‘reasonable’—or to register ‘reasonable’ objections, rejections, acceptances, 
and so forth. Say, Outstanding Betty meets these terms with ease so that her 
voice usually counts as reasonable anyway, while Limited Paul, given his 
limited deliberative resources, does not meet them with ease so that his voice 
usually counts as reasonable only after his views and volitions have undergone 
(sometimes even considerable) second guessing, fi ltering, laundering, or revi-
sions. I take it that Betty and Paul here have standing of unequal purchase. But 
this purchase differential is now not owed to the fact that actualist discursive 
respect is applied to one but not the other. It is owed to the fact that Betty and 
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Paul bring different resources to the task: given her superior resources, Betty 
qualifi es as more ‘reasonable’ than Paul. 
 The contrast between JP1 and JP2 suggests a distinction between  formal 
and  substantive equality of discursive standing. Let me take it that a justifi -
cation practice accords to relevant people discursive standing that is formally 
equal only if (i) it accords them discursive standing of the same abstract type 
(e.g., constitutive discursive standing), and (ii) applies to each the same 
threshold of authoritative acceptability. A justifi cation practice accords to 
people discursive standing that is substantively equal, however, only if their 
respective discursive standing has equal discursive purchase. Thus, JP1 seems 
further removed from the egalitarian commitments of justifi catory reciprocity 
than JP2: JP1 accords to Betty and Paul discursive standing of the same abstract 
kind, but that standing is neither formally nor substantively equal. By contrast, 
JP2 accords them discursive standing that is formally equal, although it is not 
also substantively equal. 
 Alas, purchase differentials that result from resource differentials are unavoid-
able in any form of larger-scale real-life public justifi cation. Who counts as an 
Outstanding Betty or a Limited Paul in a given practice of public justifi cation 
depends on how the practice defi nes reasonableness (assuming it adopts some 
reasonableness threshold), but it also depends on what deliberative resources 
people bring to the task of public reasoning. And there always are differences 
between our deliberative resources—or whatever capacities, skills, commit-
ments, attitudes, views, volitions, and so on, our practical reasoning draws on. 
People’s deliberative resources are unlikely to fall below some baseline that 
comes with intelligent agency. But it is equally plain that their resources often 
vary greatly in ways that affect how readily available it is for them to count as 
‘reasonable’—especially when ‘reasonableness’ is taken to require not just 
basic criticality and reasonability, but, say, substantive commitments not every-
one shares anyway. And we usually do not know just how readily available this 
is for them at least when distant strangers are concerned—if only because we 
do not know just what their deliberative resources are. Thus: if the standard 
of justifi catory reciprocity calls for justifi cation practices that allocate sub-
stantively equal discursive standing, we would not know when our attempts 
at justifi catory reciprocity succeed where large and diverse, society-scale groups 
are concerned. But such just are the constituencies of the standard in its alleged 
main role as a standard of moral or political justifi cation. If the standard is to 
be a serious candidate for this role, then something must give way. 
 This point is less trivial than it might seem at fi rst sight. It suggests we reject 
a maximalist conception of justifi catory reciprocity—call it ‘deep reciprocity’:
 DR   φ is acceptable equally (or reciprocally) by Betty and Paul if and only if (i) 
Betty and Paul can each accept  φ reasonably and (ii) meeting the threshold 
of reasonableness is an option  equally available to both, given their actual 
deliberative resources. 
Public Justifi cation, Inclusion, and Discursive Equality  19 
Deep reciprocity requires not simply that justifi cation practices allocate discur-
sive standing that is equal in some purchase-sensitive way. Rather, it requires 
substantive equality. This may have intuitive appeal. As we have just seen, 
however, it would push justifi catory reciprocity out of its alleged main role. 
As we do not know with relevant specifi city what the deliberative resources 
of relevant people are, we would rarely, if ever, be able to tell whether a given 
reasonableness threshold is suitably available by all relevant people. In the 
world as we know it, then, we have reasons to set aside DR. 
 We should not fall into the opposite extreme and opt for a purchase- insensitive , 
minimalist conception of justifi catory reciprocity—call it ‘nominal reciprocity’:
 NR   φ is acceptable equally (or reciprocally) by Betty and Paul if and only if Betty 
and Paul can each accept  φ reasonably. 
Nominal reciprocity is consistent with objectionable forms of discursive inequality. 
Consider a justifi cation practice, JP3, which accords to all relevant people discur-
sive standing of the same abstract type and applies to all relevant people the same 
reasonableness threshold. But JP3 defi nes that threshold in terms that give trump-
ing weight to moral conceptions, C, that members of Dominant Group typically 
endorse, and members of Marginal Group typically reject. Say, JP3 counts accep-
tances, or rejections, as authoritative, or reasonable, only if they cohere with C. 
JP3 instantiates formal equality. Yet this would merely mask that JP3 gives full 
discursive standing only to members of Dominant Group—thus cementing their 
dominating infl uence at the level of practices of reason giving. It hence seems 
that NR would not provide a plausible conception of justifi catory reciprocity. 
 If NR is unsuitable, a more familiar conception of justifi catory reciprocity is 
not quite suitable either—call it ‘strong reciprocity’:
 SR   φ is acceptable equally (or reciprocally) by Betty and Paul if and only if (i) Betty 
and Paul can each accept  φ reasonably, given (ii) a threshold of reasonableness 
that is  equally acceptable by them.  36  
Strong reciprocity leads us back to the problem of nominal reciprocity, albeit 
at a deeper level of thought. For when are reasonableness thresholds equally 
acceptable by Betty and Paul? Surely, what matters is not their equal brute 
acceptability, but their equal  authoritative acceptability. Yet that Betty and 
Paul can accept some reasonableness threshold ‘authoritatively’ does not 
mean that this is an option equally open to both. Thus, SR, too, can mask 
relevant discursive inequality. 
 36  This is akin to Bruce W. Brower’s view of public reasoning as reasoning by a 
standard of equal rational acceptability given a standard of rationality that is 
‘equally acceptable’ by all relevant others. See Brower ( 1994 ). 
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 The second challenge, then, is to specify the nature of discursive equality in 
justifi catory reciprocity in a way that maintains purchase-sensitivity, but that does 
not push the standard of justifi catory reciprocity out of its alleged main role. The 
above suggests that a conception of justifi catory reciprocity must be located in the 
normative space  between deep reciprocity and nominal reciprocity. If purchase-
sensitivity matters—as it seems to, not least given emancipatory intuitions—we 
should reject purchase-insensitive conceptions of justifi catory reciprocity such as 
nominal reciprocity and with it, I suggested, strong reciprocity. However, purchase-
sensitivity cannot take the maximalist form of deep reciprocity. The standard of 
justifi catory reciprocity is a viable candidate for the role of a standard of robustly 
public justifi cation only if either (i) it does not after all require discursive standing 
to be equal, or (ii) discursive standing can count as equal even when it is  unequal 
in purchase. This is an uneasy result. If we set aside (i)—given egalitarian 
intuitions—then if equal discursive standing is not (also) a matter of discursive 
standing that is equal in purchase, what is it a matter of? How much  purchase 
inequality is compatible with justifi catory reciprocity? How much is permissible, 
or justifi able? The target of these questions is not the importance of discursive 
equality, but the view that justifi catory reciprocity is a natural ally of egalitari-
anism at the level of discursive inclusion. For it is not clear what kind of discur-
sive equality, if any, justifi catory reciprocity can require.  37  
 Let me add one more point. One manoeuver that is possible here surfaced 
earlier: we might index the purchase of an agent’s discursive standing not to 
 37  As an anonymous reviewer notes, purchase differentials that arise through differences 
in deliberative resources might sometimes be permissible. In fact, some  must be per-
missible if discursive equality is purchase sensitive and a standard of justifi catory 
reciprocity is to be a serious candidate for the role of a standard of justifi cation. When 
are purchase inequalities permissible? It is hard to tell: many initially plausible, but 
potentially confl icting, permissibility constraints are conceivable. To sample just two, 
consider a justifi cation practice, JP4, which sets its bar for authoritativeness  ψ such 
that it counts discursive input about a given subject matter, S, as authoritative only if 
this input demonstrates special expertise about S. Now consider  Best Results (BR): 
purchase inequalities that arise from JP’s adoption of  ψ are permissible only if JP is 
more likely to recognize discursive input as authoritative that JP  should recognize as 
such when it adopts  ψ , than when it does not adopt  ψ (as assessed on JP-independent 
grounds). In light of BR, at least some of JP4’s purchase differentials might be per-
missible. Yet factor in that JP4’s participants might relate to each other in ways that 
constitute relevant recognitive improprieties, e.g., social biases, identity prejudices, 
or Fricker-type hermeneutic injustices, widely conceived so as to not be limited to 
epistemic, strictly truth-related pursuits (see Fricker  2007 , esp. pp. 152-169). Thus, 
take  Impropriety Prohibited (IP): purchase differentials within JP are permissible only 
if they do  not result from recognitive impropriety (as defi ned by a JP-independent 
standard). IP might prohibit the very purchase differentials that BR permits if, say, 
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the actual deliberative resources of that actual agent, but construe purchase in 
idealized or normalized terms. For example, we might index it to the recourses 
that the agent should have, or would have after relevant improvement; or to 
ideal resources of ideal agents; or to average resources or minimal resources—
amongst other possibilities. Purchase may need to be construed in such terms 
if we want to maintain (i) that the standard of justifi catory reciprocity is viable 
as a standard of public justifi cation and (ii) that the standard in that role calls 
for discursive standing that is equal in purchase. After all, idealization and 
normalization enable us to identify discursive standing as ‘equal’ in purchase 
even when it is relevantly unequal in actual purchase. However, this is a spurious 
achievement. If discursive standing that is equal in idealized or normalized 
purchase can be relevantly unequal in real purchase, equality of idealized or 
normalized purchase can still mask relevant discursive inequality. And so the 
question still is how much (actual) purchase inequality is compatible with 
justifi catory reciprocity, and how much is permissible or justifi able. 
 6.  Conclusion 
 To conclude, there can be different conceptions of justifi catory reciprocity, 
depending on how we calibrate the standard of reciprocal acceptability, or 
the discursive respect it allocates, in the dimensions of depth, scope, and 
purchase. Political liberalism’s variant of justifi catory reciprocity has high 
values in the dimensions of depth and purchase, but an implausibly low value 
in the dimension of scope. For political liberalism, robustly public justifi cation 
fully enfranchises reasonable people only, while people count as reasonable 
only if they share political liberalism’s defi ning commitments. This invites 
the charge of public dogma. 
 One response to this is to opt for a more inclusive form of robustly public 
justifi cation. I drew out two problems that an inclusive conception of robustly 
public justifi cation faces. On the one hand, it needs to calibrate robustly public 
justifi cation in the above dimensions in such a way that it is plausibly inclusive 
in scope and rich in discursive standing, while ensuring plausible conclusions 
and avoiding self-defeat—without public dogma. On the other hand, it needs 
it relevantly misrecognizes some JP4-relevant people to discount their discursive 
input just because it does not instantiate whatever BR defi nes as ‘special expertise.’ 
As this illustrates, there can be, and are, many competing considerations that bear on 
the permissibility of purchase inequality. It is open how best to systematize them; and 
it is open what permissibility constraints on purchase inequality we should adopt. 
A more systematic treatment of the matter calls for an  ethic of discursive purchase —
which is beyond the scope of my current discussion. At any rate: once we construe of 
justifi catory reciprocity in non-ideal terms and accept that discursive equality is pur-
chase sensitive, questions about the permissibility of purchase inequality multiply—
bringing this out was part of the point of this section. 
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to conceptualize discursive equality in purchase-sensitive terms without 
pushing the standard of justifi catory reciprocity out of its alleged main role. 
Both problems go to the heart of justifi catory reciprocity, or its normative 
grammar. And both are diffi cult to overcome. If there are no widely shareable 
ways to overcome them, there is no form of robustly public justifi cation that 
we can with good confi dence claim to be inclusive, non-dogmatic, and eman-
cipatory and egalitarian in the right way. 
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